ABSTRACT This paper investigates variant-gated recurrent units with encoders to preprocess packets for payload-aware intrusion detection. The variant-gated recurrent units include an encoded gated recurrent unit (E-GRU) and an encoded binarized gated recurrent unit (E-BinGRU). First, the originally collected traffic is split into packets that are segmented into fixed length. Next, the temporal features of the segmented packets with payloads and headers are extracted by the encoders of variant-gated recurrent units. Then, the performance of the intrusion detection system (IDS) is evaluated in terms of accuracy, detection rate, and false alarm rate. It is worth noting that we use the encoder to automatically preprocess network packets to obtain the features that accurately represent the network packets. The variant-gated recurrent units automatically learn network packet payload and header features to effectively improve the detection rate of the IDS. In addition, the E-BinGRU drastically reduces the memory size required and replaces most arithmetic operations with the bit-wise operations. E-GRU and E-BinGRU have never been used before in the network intrusion detection. The experimental results based on ISCX2012 show that the intrusion detection based on the investigated variant-gated recurrent units achieves higher accuracy and detection rates than three of the state-of-the-art methods. The accuracy rates of E-GRU and E-BinGRU are up to 99.9% and 99.7%, respectively, and the detection rates of E-GRU and E-BinGRU are up to 99.9% and 99.8%, respectively. The memory usage of E-GRU is approximately 32 times that of GRU.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defending against network attacks and protecting information security have high importance in network space. The intrusion detection system (IDS) [1] was introduced to monitor the network status, assess security status, and take appropriate precautionary measures before attacks. IDSs are classified into signature-based detection [2] and anomaly-based detection [3] . Signature-based detection is capable of detecting known attack behavior, and anomaly-based detection is used to discover unknown attack behavior by detecting the features of network packets. It is critical to find a feature set that characterizes network packets 97.0% of the entire network packet. If the payload is discarded directly, this may result in a lower detection rate of IDSs due to the loss of valid information. Moreover, packet preprocessing is the basis for improving the performance of the entire IDS because the network packet features obtained by packet preprocessing directly affect the final performance of the IDS. Deep learning approaches have a good potential for achieving effective data representation. Therefore, the encoder is used to preprocess the network packet, and the important features are automatically extracted from the network packet. Then, a gated recurrent unit (GRU) or binarized gated recurrent unit (Bin-GRU) is used for network intrusion detection. The features obtained by using the encoder are superior to the features of artificial design, which can improve the intrusion detection capability of IDSs.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. (1) There are two problems with the existing GRU algorithm. One is that much manual experience is required to preprocess data packets for network packets. The other is the complex structure of neural networks leading to the disadvantages of large memory usage and increased power consumption [10] . These problems are becoming more and more prominent as the number of network packets that need to be analyzed increases. For the first problem, we introduce the encoded gated recurrent unit (E-GRU). This algorithm uses an encoder to automatically preprocess network packets. The encoder often gives a better representation of the input than the original raw input, and the encoder is always the compression of the input data which is the important features of the input. After that, the extracted features are used as input to the GRU for intrusion detection. For the second problem, we introduce the encoded binarized gated recurrent unit (E-BinGRU). This is the first time that binary weights and activation of gated recurrent units with encoders has been investigated for payload-aware intrusion detection to reduce memory size. (2) Compared with traditional manual preprocessing, the use of encoders to automatically preprocess network packets can better detect different attacks. Evaluation showed that the detection rate (DR) of the E-GRU reached 99.9%. E-GRU achieves the best performances regarding the DR of attack network packet exceeding those of the other state-of-the-art methods by 3%. The accuracy of the E-BinGRU was 99.7%, which is higher than that of the Bin-GRU without the encoder. The accuracy of the E-GRU was 99.9%, which is as high as that of the GRU. The worst cases were tested to confirm stability with respect to accuracy, detection rate, and false alarm rate. (3) In order to reduce memory size, we used E-BinGRU for network intrusion detection. E-BinGRU drastically reduce memory size and replace most arithmetic operations with bit-wise operations, which is expected to substantially improve power-efficiency. The results showed that memory usage shrunk by at least 21 times by using binary weights and activation.
Section II describes related work. Section III introduces the preliminary knowledge for this paper. Section IV introduces the IDS based on payload-aware packet preprocess using variant gated recurrent units. Section V introduces the experiment. Section VI discusses the results. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK A. INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUES
Intrusion detection was classified into signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection [11] . A signature-based detection technology matches network packets with rules already stored in the database and generates alerts when a match occurs [12] . Signature-based detection technology is also known as rule-based detection technology [13] . This method requires the establishment of rules based on manual experience [13] . In addition, this method cannot detect new attacks [14] . Anomaly-based detection technology [14] finds features that accurately characterize network packets, detects the features of normal and abnormal network packets, and can discover unknown attack behavior. Anomaly-based detection techniques are also known as behavior-based detection techniques [13] . In addition, the decision rules of the anomaly-based detection technique are usually generated automatically, and there is no need to develop rules based on manual experience. This method obtains rules that accurately describe network packets, so we use anomaly-based detection technology for intrusion detection. Algorithms such as neural networks and clustering have proven to be effective solutions for identifying anomalies. In recent years, there have been some studies on anomaly-based detection techniques. Hareesh et al. [15] used a payload-based histogram for network intrusion detection analysis. This algorithm extracted the main factors influencing the network intrusion detection from the payload through the principal component analysis (PCA) algorithm, and used these factors to construct the histogram. Rieck and Laskov [9] proposed an embedding technique for payloads in vector space. An algorithm was used to extract many substrings from the payload through tokens and identified these sub-characters as features. The common point of these studies is that preprocessing the payload requires much manual experience. However, it is difficult to accurately characterize the features of both headers and payloads based on manual experience. Furthermore, the information contained in payloads does not have a uniform format, and the length of the payload is not a fixed value, which make it more difficult to accurately characterize the payload according to human experience preprocessing. Therefore, representation learning is used to automatically preprocess both headers and payloads to obtain the features of the original network packets. This approach makes full use of the data in the network packets. Representation learning [16] , [17] refers to the more reasonable means of automatic extraction of data.
B. NEURAL NETWORK FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
There are some algorithms for intrusion detection, such as the time series prediction method [18] , k-nearest neighbors [19] , and multivariate correlation analysis [20] . The time series prediction method has low prediction accuracy in a time-varying network environment. The k-nearest neighbor algorithm has high spatial complexity and does not apply to large sample sets. For example, in 2015, Tan et al. proposed a technology-based denial of service attack detection. However, the above algorithms require manual experience and data preprocessing skills, and it is difficult to accurately characterize network packets.
Deep learning techniques [21] have rapidly emerged in machine learning and have been applied to IDSs [22] , [23] . Wang et al. [24] used convolutional neural networks (CNN) to implement network intrusion detection by converting network traffic into pictures. However, the above studies ignored the temporal features of network packets. Yin et al. proposed a network intrusion detection algorithm based on recurrent neural networks (RNN). The algorithm could not learn long-term dependence and easily led to the vanishing gradient problem. Kim et al. [25] proposed a network intrusion detection algorithm based on long-short-term-memory (LSTM). However, there are many parameters in this model, and it takes more time to adjust the model parameters to the optimal.
III. PRELIMINARY
Even though deep neural networks (DNNs) have been successfully applied to many IDS related tasks, they rely on stacking a few frames in order to take context into account [26] . The Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is a DNN, where connections can form a directed cycle. The RNN [27] includes an input layer, a hidden layer of the self-connection, and an output layer. In addition, the hidden layer of neurons at time t accepts the input from the input layer and the hidden layer output at time t-1 [27] . However, the RNN could not learn the long-term dependence leading to the vanishing gradient problem.
A LSTM recurrent neural network replaces the hidden units in a RNN with memory blocks [28] . Fig. 1 shows the typical architecture of a LSTM. There are three main gates in the LSTM, namely the forget gate, the input gate, and the output gate. The forget gate f t determines the degree of retention of the state of the cell at the previous moment. The input gate i t determines how much of the network's input is saved to the cell state at the current time. The output gate o t is used to control how much of the unit state is output to the current output of the LSTM. All the relationship can be defined as follow.
where W represents the weight matrix and b is a bias vector. In addition, x t is the input vector at time step t, h t is the output vector at time step t, σ is a sigmoid function, and C t is the cell state. However, there are many parameters in the LSTM, and it takes more time to adjust the model parameters to be optimal.
Compared to LSTM, the GRU has fewer gates. This is because the GRU combines the input and forget gates into a single gate, the update gate z [27] . Fig. 2 shows the typical architecture of a GRU. There are two main gates in the GRU, namely the update gate, and the reset gate. The update gate Z t is used to control how much of the previous state information is brought into the current state. The reset gate r t is used to control the degree to which the GRU ignores the status information of the previous moment. All the relationship can be defined as follow.
where x t is the input vector at time step t, and h t is the output vector at time step t. The other symbols are the same as before.
FIGURE 2.
Structure of the GRU. VOLUME 7, 2019 However, there are two problems with the existing GRU algorithm. One is that much manual experience is required to preprocess data packets for network packets, and the other is that memory usage is high. Therefore, we have introduced variant gated recurrent units, which include E-GRU and E-BinGRU. Fig. 3 shows the architecture of a variant GRU. Variant W and variant activation mean that the weight W and the activation function in the E-GRU are the same as in the GRU, but the weight W and the activation function in the E-BinGRU are binarized. In addition, the variant GRU uses the encoder for automatic preprocessing. The encoder often gives a better representation of the input than the original raw input, and the encoder is always the compression of the input data which is the important features of the input. The detailed algorithm flow will be introduced in Section IV. In subsequent experiments, variant GRU also showed a great advantage. 
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY: VARIANT GATED RECURRENT UNITS
It refers to a gating mechanism in recurrent neural networks. This model as a variant of recurrent neural network is able to process memories of sequential data by storing previous inputs in the internal state of networks and map from the entire history of previous inputs to target vectors in principal [27] .
2) VARIANT GATED RECURRENT UNITS
It includes binarized gated recurrent unit (Bin-GRU), E-GRU, E-BinGRU, bidirectional gated recurrent unit (BGRU), local feature-based gated recurrent unit (LFGRU), and so on.
Xu et al. [28] proposed BGRU. In BGRU, the bidirectional recurrent structure can enable GRU to process the sequence input in two directions forward and backward with two individual hidden layers. Therefore, each hidden layer at one certain time step can capture past and future context jointly. Zhao et al. [29] proposed LFGRU. In LFGRU, the local features are first extracted from segments or windows of time-series data. Then, BGRU is used with weighted local features averaging to learn representation from the sequence of local features. However, the above method consumes much memory when processing a large amount of data. Therefore, Bin-GRU is proposed, which binarizes the weight and activation function on the basis of GRU. In addition, the above methods require much manual experience for data preprocessing. Therefore, E-GRU and E-BinGRU are proposed. E-GRU and E-BinGRU use the encoder for automatic preprocessing on the basis of GRU and Bin-GRU, respectively. Bin-GRU, E-GRU, and E-BinGRU will be defined in detail later. In this article, we mainly discuss E-GRU and E-BinGRU.
3) AUTO-ENCODER
It refers to a type of artificial neural network used to learn efficient data codings in an unsupervised manner. The aim of an auto-encoder is to learn a representation (encoding) for a set of data, typically for dimensionality reduction. Along with the reduction side, a reconstructing side is learned, where the auto-encoder tries to generate from the reduced encoding a representation as close as possible to its original input [30] .
4) ENCODED GATED RECURRENT UNIT (E-GRU)
It refers to the dimensionality reduction of the input data using the encoder part of the auto-encoder, and then the output of the encoder as the input of the GRU.
5) BINARIZED GATED RECURRENT UNIT (BIN-GRU)
It refers to GRU with binary weights and activations.
6) ENCODED BINARIZED GATED RECURRENT UNIT (E-BINGRU)
It refers to the dimensionality reduction of the input data using the encoder part of the auto-encoder, and then the output of the encoder is used as the input of the Bin-GRU.
7) FEATURE EXTRACTION
It refers to removing redundant features and retaining important features that reflect the state of the system [31] .
8) AUTOMATIC PREPROCESSING
It refers to the automatic extraction of features from the original packet and eliminates manual intervention.
9) NETWORK TRAFFIC
It refers to a sequence of traffic bytes that constitutes network traffic. According to the format described by specific network protocols, multiple traffic bytes are combined to form a network packet, and multiple network packets communicated between two sides are further combined to form network traffic.
10) NETWORK PACKET PAYLOAD
It refers to the information in the network packet except for the header.
B. FLOWCHART Fig. 4 is a flowchart of a network intrusion detection algorithm. Network intrusion detection includes three main parts. The first part is data formatting to split the original network traffic into network packets. The second part is the intrusion detection of network packets using variant gated recurrent units. In this part, we use the encoder to preprocess the network packets. The preprocessed network packets are used as input to the GRU or Bin-GRU. The third part is cross verification. It is worth noting that data preprocessing is the basis for improving the performance of the entire IDS, because the network packet features obtained by data preprocessing directly affect the final performance of the IDS. Traditional manual preprocessing requires considerable manual experience and data preprocessing skills. It is difficult to accurately characterize network packets. In addition, the data processed by the traditional preprocessing method generally does not include the payload, and the detection rate is limited due to the limited amount of analysis data. Therefore, the proposed method preprocesses both the header and the payload.
C. DATA FORMATTING
Data formatting converts the original network traffic flow to features of the network packets required by the variant gated recurrent units. Network packets are the basic unit used to determine whether network traffic flow is intrusive. Therefore, we use SplitCap [32] to group interacting source IPs and destination IPs in network traffic into the same network packet.
Data formatting is constructed in the following three modes. The first mode is to extract the payload from each network packet. The second mode is to extract the header from each network packet. The third mode is to extract the header and payload from each network packet. The first mode assumes that there are n packets in the network traffic flow. The payload of these n packets is m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n . Among them, h i and m i are the header and payload of the i th packet, respectively, which are represented by the byte type. For the second and third mode, the same method as in the first mode is used for formatting. It is worth noting that in the third mode, (h i + m i ) is both the header and the payload of the i th packet, which is represented by the byte type. The length of the payload varies, but the input length of the neural network is fixed. Therefore, the payload needs to be processed as follows. Assume that the network traffic flow is divided into q network packets. After that, we segment the first r bytes from the information obtained from each network packet. Finally, the entire network traffic flow is processed as a q*r vector. If the length of the network packet is less than r bytes, the network packet is filled with 0 to r bytes. It is worth noting that we use this method to convert variable length data to a fixed-size vector because the LSTM-CNN [16] algorithm for comparison uses the same method to process network packets of different lengths. We process network packets of different lengths in the same, which avoids the influence of this factor on the experimental results. VOLUME 7, 2019 Each byte in the r bytes obtained from the network packet corresponds to a feature. Thus, we normalize the bytes to a range of 0-1. A byte-expressed status code is between 0 and 255, so the normalization method converts each byte to a status code and divides it by 255. In addition, the activation function of this model is tanh. Therefore the greatest gradient is around 0 when the model's input value is large or small, which is where tanh's derivative tends to 0, and this results in slow optimization. Therefore, in order to distribute the input over the faster optimization range, we subtract 0.5 from all input values, making the input range between −0.5 and 0.5. Algorithm 1 describes the above data formatting method in detail.
Algorithm 1 Data Formatting
Input: network traffic flow (f i ). Output: q packets of network traffic flow, every packet vec-
Step 1:Split network traffic flow 2: Use splitcap to split the network traffic flow into packets (p 1 ,p 2 ,· · · ,p q ). 3: Step 2:Extract the information of network packets 4: while n packets have not been processed do 5: Analyze every packet that contains header (h i ) and payload (m i ). 6: Three ways to extract information from packets: 7: a)I = m i . 8 :
c)I = (h i + m i ). 10: Segment the first r bytes from I , and the segmented part is called S.
11:
Normalize.
12:
Each byte in S will image a feature, then we get vector (v 11 ,v 12 ,· · · ,v 1r ). 13 : end while 14: Step 3:Constructed vector 15 : V consists of q packets, every packet vector
D. VARIANT GATED RECURRENT UNITS
The investigated variant gated recurrent units include E-GRU and E-BinGRU.
1) ENCODED GATED RECURRENT UNIT FOR PACKET PREPROCESSING
E-GRU refers to the dimensionality reduction of the input data using the encoder part of the auto-encoder, and then the output of the encoder is used as the input of the GRU. We use the encoder for payload-aware packet preprocessing and GRU for intrusion detection.
a. PACKET PREPROCESSING USING ENCODER
In the auto-encoder, the hidden layer often gives a better representation of the input than the original raw input, and the hidden layer is always the compression of the input data which are the important features of the input. Therefore, we only use the encoder part of auto-encoder, which is equivalent to the dimensionality reduction of the original raw input data. The input of the E-GRU's input layer is the formatted network packet, that is, the output vector V of Algorithm 1. Step 2:Create GRU model 5: Add the 1 st GRU layer of l 1 units whose dropout is d 1 and recurrent dropout is r 1 . 6: Add the 2 nd GRU layer of l 2 units whose dropout is d 2 and recurrent dropout is r 2 . 7:
Algorithm 2 Encoded Gated
Step 3: Train and validate model 8: while early stop condition is not met do 9: while training dataset is not empty do 10: Prepare a mini-batch dataset as model input.
11:
Compute categorical cross entropy loss function.
12:
Update weights and bias using SGD gradient descent optimization algorithm. 13: end while 14: Validate model with validation set. 15 : end while 16: Step 4:Test model 17: Test fine-tuned hyper-parameters with test dataset. 18: return Evaluate result in test dataset.
T is the output data vector of encoder. It is worth noting that n is larger than m. It uses the tanh activation function and finally receives a node value.
where W represents the encoder weight matrix with size m * n and b is a bias vector of dimensionality m. Therefore, the input vector is encoded to a lower-dimensional vector.
b. PAYLOAD-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION USING GRU
The GRU consists of input
candidate hidden layer h, and output layer Y = [y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y m ] T . The input of the input layer is the network packet after preprocessing, that is, the output of the encoder. Input layer: The input data vector is X . The output of the encoder is used as the input of the GRU.
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Update Gate: Used to control how much of the previous status information is brought into the current status. The greater the value of the update gate, the more status information is brought in from the previous time. The update gate was calculated by using (7). Reset Gate: Used to control the degree of ignoring the status information of the previous moment. The smaller the value of reset gate, the greater the amount of information ignored. The reset gate was calculated by using (8) . Hidden layer unit: The hidden layer unit h in the GRU is activated at time t. The hidden layer unit was calculated by using (10) . Candidate hidden units: The hidden layer is calculated on the input x t and the previous hidden layer value h t−1 . It uses the tanh activation function and finally receives a node value. x t i refers to the value of input i at time t, and refers to multiplication between the r t and h t−1 elements. The candidate hidden layer unit was calculated by using (9) . Activation function: We use the improved tanh as the activation function. The expression of the activation function is as follows:
Backward propagation: In order to improve the stability and convergence speed of the training process, this algorithm uses the batch gradient descent method for training. At the same time, error back propagation is used for parameter adjustment. For the GRU model, there are two backpropagation modes. One uses only the last moment as an output, and the other uses the mean value of each moment as an output. The gradient derivations of the two methods are different. The parameter update method at this time is as follows.
In this formula, w(t) is the weight update of the t th iteration, η is the learning rate of the algorithm, 0 ≤ α < 1 is the momentum term, and J is the cost function. Output layer: This layer receives the output value of the hidden layer as input, multiplies the current weight, and finally outputs the probability vector.
2) ENCODED BINARIZED GATED RECURRENT UNIT FOR PACKET PREPROCESSING E-BinGRU refers to the dimensionality reduction of the input data using the encoder part of the auto-encoder, and then the output of the encoder is used as the input of the Bin-GRU. We use the encoder for payload-aware packet preprocessing and Bin-GRU for intrusion detection. The existing machine learning algorithms use a large number of memory sizes, so we use Bin-GRU to reduce the use of memory.
a. PACKET PREPROCESSING USING ENCODER
The encoder part of E-BinGRU has the same model structure and input as the encoder part of E-GRU, so it will not be repeated here.
b. PAYLOAD-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION USING BIN-GRU
Bin-GRU is used for intrusion detection. When the weights of Bin-GRU are binary, most operations of multiplication and accumulation can be replaced by simple operations of accumulation. This is beneficial because the operation of multiplication takes much more memory space and consumes more power during the digital implementation of neural networks [33] . The Bin-GRU binarizes the weight and activation of the GRU, and the other parts are the same as in the GRU. Further explanation of several key components mentioned in Algorithm 3 is as follows. Step 3: Train and validate model 8: while early stop condition is not met do 9: while training dataset is not empty do 10: Prepare a mini-batch dataset as model input.
Algorithm 3 Encoded Binarized Gated

11:
Compute categorical cross entropy loss function. 12: Update weights and bias using SGD gradient descent optimization algorithm. 13: end while 14: Validate model with validation set. 15 : end while 16: Step 4:Test model 17: Test fine-tuned hyper-parameters with test dataset. 18: return Evaluate result in test dataset.
Activation function of Bin-GRU:
We constrain the activations to either +1 or −1. In order to transform the real-valued variables into those two values, we use two different binarization functions [30] . The first binarization function is deterministic:
where x b is the binarized variable (weight or activation) and x is the real-valued variable. The second binarization function is stochastic:
+1 with probability p = σ (x), −1 with probability 1 − p. (16) where σ is the ''hard sigmoid'' function:
The stochastic binarization is more appealing than the sign function, but is harder to implement as it requires the hardware to generate random bits when quantizing. As a result, we mostly use the deterministic binarization function (i.e., the sign function), with the exception of activations at train-time in some of our experiments [34] .
Weight of Bin-GRU:
We constrain the weights to either +1 or -1.We used the weight with the exception of activations at train-time in some of our experiments.
where w b is the binarized variable and w the real-valued variable.
3) 10-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION
In order to obtain a reliable and stable model, we used the k-fold cross-validation technique for performance evaluation, in which all samples were used as training and test sets, and each sample was verified once. In this technique, a dataset is randomly divided into k different parts. In each experiment, one part is selected as the validation set, while all other k-1 parts are treated as the training dataset. Every experiment obtained a corresponding detection rate. We calculated the average value of the k-times resulting detection rates as an estimate for the accuracy of the algorithm. For our experiments, we used the value of k = 10 because of the resulting low bias, low variance, low overfitting, and good error estimation [35] .
V. EVALUATION
In this section, the performance of the network intrusion detection algorithm using GRU, E-GRU, E-BinGRU, and Bin-GRU is evaluated based on the ISCX 2012 intrusion detection data set.
A. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 1) DATASET
The current public datasets are generally network packet feature data that have been manually selected, such as KDD CUP 1999 [36] , NSL-KDD [37] , and Kyoto2009 [38] . The existing datasets containing original network packets are DARPA 1998 and ISCX 2012. Many papers have pointed out that many attack patterns in KDD Cup 1999 are outdated [39] , and that the data in KDD Cup 1999 are extracted from the DARPA 1998 dataset [40] . Table 1 is a data description of ISCX 2012. Table 2 shows the statistics of ISCX 2012. The dataset consists of 7 days of network traffic data, including normal traffic and four types of attack traffic, such as brute force SSH, DDoS, Http DoS, and infiltrating. According to statistics, the average length of network packets in the ISCX 2012 dataset is 743, and that of the headers is 20. The headers only account for 2.7% of the entire network packets.
It should be noted that the traffic data of June 16 has only 11 attack network traffics, and according to the provider's description, we removed these 11 network traffics and considered all traffic data of June 16 as normal. From Table 2 , it can be seen that there are less data of the attack type in the existing ISCX 2012 dataset. The ratio of attack data to normal data is 35.6:1, so the dataset is not balanced. In order to solve this problem, we resampled the data of the four attack types so that the ratio of normal data to attack data reached 6:4. Table 3 shows that the ratio of attack data to normal data in the processed dataset is 6:4, so the dataset is relatively balanced. 
2) EVALUATION METRICS
This article uses accuracy, detection rate, and false alarm rate to evaluate the performance. The accuracy rate is used to evaluate the overall performance of the system. The detection rate is used to evaluate the system's ability to detect intrusions. The false alarm rate is used to evaluate the system's misjudgment of non-intrusion behavior. The formulas are as follows.
Accuracy(ACC)
False Negative (FN) indicates a network packet that was determined to be normal, but is actually an intrusion. False Positive (FP) indicates a network packet that was determined to be an intrusion, but is actually normal behavior. True Negative (TN) indicates a network packet that was determined to be normal behavior, and is in fact normal behavior. True Positive (TP) indicates a network packet that was determined to be an intrusion, and is in fact an intrusion.
3) CONFIGURATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
The hardware and software used in the experiments are presented below. The software frameworks were Keras [41] and TensorFlow [42] backend. The configuration of the experimental environment is shown in Table 5 . In addition, we used a 12 GHz NVIDIA Tesla K40m GPU as an accelerator. 
B. THREE DIFFERENT DATA FORMATTING METHODS IN PACKET PREPROCESSING
Three data methods are used to process the network packets: a) obtaining the payload from network packets, b) obtaining the headers from network packets, and c) obtaining headers and payloads from network packets. From Table 6, Table 7,  and Table 8 , it can be concluded that method b) has the lowest detection rate among the above three methods of data formatting. The accuracies of data formatting using method a) and method c) were higher than 98.2%.
Using method b) to construct the IDS achieved a lower detection rate than using methods a) and c). One possible explanation is that the headers contain only fixed information such as source address, destination address, and network protocol. The payloads contain information such as communication behavior in the current network environment. 
TABLE 7.
Performance of three different data formatting methods for packet preprocessing using E-BinGRU (%).
TABLE 8. Performance of three different data formatting methods for packet preprocessing using E-GRU (%).
Therefore, the payloads play a more prominent role in identifying whether there is an intrusion.
Using method a) to construct the IDS achieved a higher detection rate and accuracy than using method c). One possible explanation is that the source address, source port, destination address, destination port, protocol type and other information in the header are more important. However, in the ISCX 2012 dataset, when the source address, source port, destination address, destination port, and protocol type of the network packet are the same, some network packets show intrusion behavior, and other parts of the network packet show normal behavior. Therefore, we believe that the information in the header caused slight interference to network intrusion detection. It was concluded that using the payload to construct the IDS achieves higher accuracy and detection. Therefore, in the following we only use method a) for data formatting.
C. THE EFFECTIVESS OF PAYLOAD SIZE IN PACKET PREPROCESSING BY E-GRU
In E-GRU, the unit of the encoder processing object is a network packet. The output of encoder often gives a better representation of the input than the original raw input, and the output of encoder is always the compression of the input data. In addition, the output of encoder contains some important features, which are extracted from the original network packet. The unit of the GRU has the ability to store the relationship between the input of the current time and the input of the previous time. Therefore, the network traffic flow is divided into network packets, and all network packets are arranged in a time series. This method retains the time-series information between network packets. Finally, the network packet payloads with different lengths are segmented to fixed length, and the segmented information is taken as the input of the E-GRU. It is worth noting that we use this method to convert variable length data to a fixed-size vector because the comparison method LSTM-CNN [16] algorithm uses the same method to process network packets of different lengths. We use the same method to process network packets of different lengths, which avoids the influence of this factor on the experimental results. The specific experiment is as follows. Table 9 shows a list of E-GRU hyper-parameters and its optimizer. Table 10 shows architecture parameters of E-GRU.
We used SplitCap to split a group of interacting source IP and destination IP in network traffic flow into the same network packet. After that, network packet payloads were segmented at lengths of 70, 100, 200, 500, 700, 1000, 1200, and 1500 bytes. Table 14 shows the network packet payload size statistics for ISCX 2012. The statistics show that the maximum payload was 1494. If the segmented length was greater than 1500 bytes, the maximum length of the network packet would be exceeded, in which case the experimental result would be meaningless. Table 11 shows the performance of the IDS with different payload lengths in packet preprocessing by using E-GRU. From the data in Table 11 , we conclude that the best results were obtained when the network packet payload length was 1200 bytes. Payload information is relevant to identifying whether there is an intrusion. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze almost all payloads to obtain better results. The network intrusion detection algorithm input using the payload of length 1500 is closer to the statistical maximum payload of 1494, which is a fuller use of the payload, but the network intrusion detection result is not as good as at the payload length of 1200. One possible explanation is that only a few payloads in ISCX 2012 are close to the length of 1500. When the segmented payload length is 1500, network packets with insufficient payload TABLE 11. Performance of IDS with different payload lengths in packet preprocessing using E-GRU (%).
TABLE 12.
Performance of IDS with different payload lengths in packet preprocessing using GRU (%). length need to be filled with zeros to reach 1500. This method interferes with network intrusion detection.
From Table 11 and Table 12 , we can conclude that almost all of the E-GRU's accuracy is better than that of the GRU's when payload lengths are greater than 200. This shows that it is effective to use the encoder to extract valid information from the network packet payload. By applying encoder to perform dimensionality reduction, we can easily capture the non-linear correlations between features. At the same time, it is proved that the dimensionality reduction of high-dimensional space is beneficial to obtain better subspace and improve the performance of the IDS. Table 13 compares the performance of E-GRU and autoencoder+GRU. As can be seen from Table 13 , the performances of E-GRU and auto-encoder+GRU are the same.
D. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PAYLOAD SIZE IN PACKET PREPROCESSING BY E-BinGRU
The E-BinGRU uses the same input data as the E-GRU. payload size in packet preprocessing using E-BinGRU. Table 18 shows a list of E-BinGRU hyper-parameters and its optimizer. Table 19 shows the architecture parameters of E-BinGRU.
From Table 15 and Table 16 , it was concluded that almost all of the E-BinGRU performances are better than that of the Bin-GRU when payload lengths is greater than 200. This shows that it is effective to use the encoder to extract valid information from the network packet payload and discard redundant information. It can be concluded from Table 17 that the memory usage of E-GRU is approximately 21.6 times that of E-BinGRU. In E-BinGRU, when we use both binary weights and activation functions, the operations of multiplication can be replaced by bitwise operations. This would have an impact on the hardware of deep learning. It can be concluded from Table 17 that the memory usage of the GRU is 1.7 times that of the E-GRU, and the memory usage of the Bin-GRU is also higher than that of the E-BinGRU. From the above conclusions, it can be concluded that preprocessing the data with encoder can reduce the memory usage of the model. Table 20 compares the performance of E-BinGRU and auto-encoder+Bin-GRU. As can be seen from Table 20 , the performance of E-BinGRU is higher than that of autoencoder+Bin-GRU. Therefore, only the encoder is used for data dimensionality reduction, and then the Bin-GRU is used for intrusion detection. 
E. INFLUENCE OF E-GRU HYPER-PARAMETERS
From the experimental results of Sections 4.3 and 4.4, it can be seen that the optimal length of the network packet payload segmentation was 1200 bytes. Table 21 shows the performance of the IDS at different learning rates. Experiments showed that the performance of the IDS is best when the learning rate is 0.01 or 0.02. With an increase in the learning rate, the IDS's ability to detect intrusions gradually declines. When the learning rate is 0.5, the detection capability of the IDS is greatly reduced. When the E-GRU learning rate is high, each step of the gradient drop is large. A high learning rate misses a lot of curve distortion information, so the local linearization is severe. Ultimately, the model's prediction results are not well-fitted with the actual data, and the accuracy of the model is not high. Table 22 shows the performance of the IDS when the number of E-GRU hidden layers is different. Experimental results show that the performance of the IDS is best when the number of neural network hidden layer nodes is 50, 80, or 150. The hyper-parameter setup process for E-BinGRU is similar to that of E-GRU. Therefore, it will not be repeated here. 
F. COMPARISON WITH THE LATEST TECHNIQUES
Researchers have proposed network intrusion detection methods such as MHCVF [4] , ALL-AGL [3] , LSTM-CNN [16] and AMGA2-NB [20] . Most of these methods preprocess network packets based on human experience and ignore the payload information. These methods result in lower detection rates due to the inability to accurately characterize network packets. More recently, a network intrusion detection method based on LSTM-CNN was proposed. This method processes network packets into a 28*28 matrix, but this processing destroys the original feature relationships of the network packets. In addition, LSTM-CNN analyzes only part of the payloads, resulting in a low attack detection rate (96.9%) due to insufficient data analysis. All investigated variant gated recurrent units are used to preprocess the header and payload of network packets. This method is more accurate than the manual preprocessing to characterize network packets. This section compares the experimental results of the proposed algorithm with existing methods. Table 23 shows a comparison of the performances of each algorithm. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the comparison of the accuracy and attack-DR performance of each algorithm, respectively. The MHCVF, ALL-AGL, and AMGA2-NB methods all use artificially preprocessed data. We use four indicators to evaluate the algorithm, including normal network packet detection rate (Normal-DR), intrusion network packet detection rate (Attack-DR), accuracy and false alarm rate. Table 23 shows that the proposed E-GRU algorithm achieves the best performances regarding the DR of normal network packets, DR of attack network packet, and accuracy rate exceeding those of the other state-of-the-art methods by 0.03%, 3%, 0.10%, respectively. The false alarm rate was only 0.14% worse than that of the best method. The proposed E-BinGRU algorithm achieves the best performances regarding the DR of normal network packets and DR of attack network packets exceeding those of the other state-of-the-art methods by 0.03% and 2.8%, respectively. The accuracy rate was only 0.24% worse than that of the best method. The false alarm rate was only 0.31% worse than that of the best method. Table 23 shows that the detection rates of the existing three methods are not high, especially the detection rate of intrusion behavior. The low detection rate of intrusion behavior means that many network packets with attacks were not detected by the system. As a result, missed inspections occurred frequently during the detection process. One possible explanation is that the payload contains information such as communication behavior in the current network environment. Therefore, ignoring the payload information or analyzing only a small amount of payload information may lower the detection rate. The network intrusion detection algorithm using LSTM-CNN preprocesses only the first 700 bytes in the header and payload. Although this method analyzes only a small portion of the payloads, the detection rate is higher than that of the three network intrusion detection methods that do not include the payloads in the preprocessed data, such as MHCVF, ALL-AGL, and AMGA2-NB. Therefore, we have reason to believe that the detection rates of MHCVF, ALL-AGL, and AMGA2-NB are not high, and this is related to the fact that no information is extracted from the payload.
It is not difficult to observe from the experimental data that the model analyzes both header and payload information. This method increases the amount of valid data for analysis, making all the detected results better. For training and testing time, the ISCX 2012 dataset appeared later. Therefore, we could not find enough literature on training, testing time, and memory size, and we were not able to evaluate it.
VI. DISCUSSION
This study investigates variant gated recurrent units with encoders to preprocess packets for payload-aware intrusion detection. Therefore, we use the original network traffic to extract the payload [16] . The originally collected traffic is split into packets, which are segmented into fixed lengths. It is worth noting that we use this method to convert variable length data to a fixed-size vector because the LSTM-CNN [16] algorithm being compared uses the same method to process network packets of different lengths. We use the same method to process network packets of different lengths, which avoids the influence of this factor on the experimental results. In future work, the full payload of network packets of different lengths will be analyzed and the performance of the two algorithms will be compared.
The variant gated recurrent units mainly include E-GRU and E-BinGRU. We use E-GRU and E-BinGRU to automatically learn the rules from network packets. This method obtains rules that accurately describe the network packet without any manual experience. In detail, E-GRU and E-BinGRU contain all the decision rules. That is to say, E-GRU and E-BinGRU are the decision rules of the proposed intrusion detection system.It is worth noting that this is a new method of automatically generating rules that does not have to convert the generated rules into an accessible format [13] .
The E-BinGRU reduces the memory size of the model by binarizing the weight and activation functions of the GRU. In future work, multi-ary activation will be applied to the model to alleviate information loss.
In addition, it is worth noting that this paper focuses on the relationship between network packets. In future work, network packets and network flow will be analyzed hierarchically.
VII. CONCLUSION
This study investigated variant gated recurrent units to preprocess network packets for payload-aware intrusion detection. E-GRU often gives a better representation of the input than the original raw input, thus resulting in better IDS performance. E-BinGRU not only gives a better representation of the input than the original raw input, but also reduces memory size and access time through binary weights and activation functions. An experiment based on ISCX 2012 showed that our proposed method achieved better performance in term of IDS detection rate than state-of-the-art methods. The experiment determined that the best performance was obtained when the length of segmentation of network packets increased to near 1200 bytes, close to the maximum 1494-byte payload length, and based on the statistics of ISCX 2012, it required almost all the payloads in the preprocessed data to achieve the best performance. Besides, the validity has been proved by adding payload as additional information. In the best case, E-GRU's accuracy rate reached 99.9%, the detection rate reached 99.9%, and the false alarm rate reached 0.1%; E-BinGRU's accuracy rate reached 99.7%, detection rate reached 99.8%, and false alarm rate reached 0.3%. The memory usage of GRU is approximately 32 times that of E-BinGRU.
The next study considered two aspects, including intrusion detection for unlabeled network packets and intrusion detection for unknown malicious traffic. Intrusion detection for unlabeled network packets aims to determine a security baseline. Intrusion detection of unknown malicious traffic is very important in practical applications. This study only performed intrusion detection on known types of malicious traffic. Whether this method has the ability to detect new malicious traffic requires further research [16] . 
